[tor-bugs] #26620 [Community/Relays]: Tor Relay Guide: relays operators shouldn't expose their fine-grained monitoring graphs public

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#26620: Tor Relay Guide: relays operators shouldn't expose their fine-grained
monitoring graphs public
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 Reporter:  ggus              |          Owner:  Nusenu
     Type:  enhancement       |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium            |      Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal            |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                    |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                    |         Points:
 Reviewer:                    |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:15 cypherpunks]:
 > since vnstat reports interface traffic and not tor-exclusive traffic I
 assume it is ok to publish, if it isn't please say so

 I think you might have missed my earlier answer:

 Replying to [comment:4 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > > we plan to publish
 > > {{{vnstati -m}}}
 > > output (monthly granularity), for servers (some servers run multiple
 tor instances, some only single)
 > > and it has XX.XX TiB granularity, let me know if you want to
 discourage that
 >
 > Please round to the nearest 10 terabytes. If you report to the nearest
 0.01 terabytes, that's 10 gigabytes per month, or 333 megabytes per day,
 which seems like a reasonable amount of usage for a client (and therefore
 something we should try to protect). Rounding to 10 terabytes is ok,
 because we can't protect clients that use 33.3 gigabytes per day. There
 aren't enough clients that use that much data.
 >
 > Please report totals across multiple machines if you can, particularly
 for machines with only a single relay.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26620#comment:17>
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