[tor-bugs] #17945 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop Tor2Web connecting to (Rendezvous) Single Onion Services

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#17945: Stop Tor2Web connecting to (Rendezvous) Single Onion Services
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 Reporter:  teor                                 |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor2web, tor-hs, 029-proposed, 029   |  Actual Points:
  -teor-no, needs-design, needs-proposal-maybe,  |
  single-onion                                   |
Parent ID:  #24962                               |         Points:  5
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
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Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Ticket #24902 adds an option to refuse establish rdv from single hop
 client.

 I think we can extend this to relays that is if the previous and next hop
 in a rendezvous circuit are unauthenticated that is client connection, the
 circuit collapses.

 I'm just wondering here the bridge factor. I guess even if a SOS is
 configured to use a bridge (is it even possible?), it would require a
 client to single hop through a bridge for the RP to deny it. And maybe we
 don't care with such a crazy setup?

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17945#comment:36>
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