[tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Sat Dec 8 13:45:10 UTC 2018
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--------------------------+----------------------------------
Reporter: wagon | Owner: arma
Type: enhancement | Status: assigned
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: unspecified
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: 0.3.4.9
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #24110 | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
--------------------------+----------------------------------
Comment (by wagon):
Replying to [comment:11 teor]:
> (Authorities don't carry much client traffic at all, but they do serve a
lot of directory documents.)
Now all authorities have `Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1`. I guess this is the
reason why they are almost never selected for normal circuits. This could
be done cleaner--as tor options which (1) disable client traffic (for
usual circuits) at authority and (2) disable use of authority on clients
when they create circuits. Requests of consensus, I suppose, just ignore
`Bandwidth` option.
> `tor ControlPort 192.0.2.1:9090` works for me.
> That's probably another bug, or we might have decided to discourage
people from using IP addresses.
Yes, it should be either documented with proper warnings or disabled
completely. Moreover, it has another bug: `ControlPort` can be specified
more than once in `torrc`, and Tor will listen on all these addresses, but
this behavior is not documented in `man torrc`. All options which can be
specified more than once are marked with a sentence like (example of
`SocksPort`):
> This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
addresses/ports.
Should we create a separate ticket about `ControlPort`?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28676#comment:12>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
More information about the tor-bugs
mailing list