[tor-bugs] #24872 [Community/Relays]: remove outdated tor relay security recommendations and update these wiki pages
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Sun Aug 5 14:05:59 UTC 2018
#24872: remove outdated tor relay security recommendations and update these wiki
pages
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Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: Jaruga
Type: defect | Status: accepted
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Community/Relays | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by nusenu):
I'd propose:
* lets limit the scope to tor in relay mode only (tor clients or tor onion
services are not covered) - this is somewhat obvious since the page lifes
under /TorRelayGuide
* title "Tor Relay Security Best Practices"
* have a (small) generic/high level section that applies to all platforms
(because we can not cover every possible OS)
* this section will not include step-by-step instructions since it is OS
independent
* the physical security section
* OS (hardware vs. virtual, OS level access authentication, pointer to
auto-updates)
* have a (bigger) section for tor
* primarily focuses on the tor daemon itself and its security relevant
settings and recommendations
* convey the order in which different options are preferred (example: bare
metal installations are considered better than VPS installation)
* consider the current installation steps as a baseline and tell people
what they could do on top of that if they want to do better than that
* include no-go's
* avoid conflicting statements regarding disk encryption
* maybe have something like levels
* basic (default install as described per the guide + auto updates)
* intermediate
* high (runs on hardware, 2FA, offline master keys with signing key
lifetime < 30day)
* lets remove the following sections:
* "Tor-only firewalling with iptables" (because we cover it generically
for all platforms in the generic section)
* Coldboot attacks (due to new offline master key section that mitigates
this attack vector)
* Replace section "Restricting SSH access" with a recommendation to use
strong authentication (part of the generic section)
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24872#comment:12>
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