[tor-bugs] #25226 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circuit cell queue can fill up memory
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    Mon Apr 16 14:01:36 UTC 2018
    
    
  
#25226: Circuit cell queue can fill up memory
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  dgoulet                              |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-cell, tor-relay, tor-dos,        |  Actual Points:
  033-must, review-group-34, security,           |
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320     |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:  arma                                 |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by dgoulet):
 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready
Comment:
 Replying to [comment:34 arma]:
 > Tiny but potentially fun bug:
 >
 > {{{
 > +static int32_t max_circuit_cell_queue_size;
 > }}}
 >
 > That starts it out at 0, right?
 Well that is a great catch! lol...
 >
 > So until the relay gets (or has) a consensus (e.g. because it just
 restarted and it's trying to bootstrap but somebody starts using it
 anyway), any circuits get closed if they get a cell?
 >
 > Maybe we should initialize it to RELAY_CIRC_CELL_QUEUE_SIZE_DEFAULT at
 the very start?
 Fixup commit: `3d1243f6f2a42324`
 Again:
 Branch (with fixup): `bug25226_033_01`
 Branch (squashed): `bug25226_033_02`
 Going in `merge_ready` for nickm's eyes.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25226#comment:35>
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