[tor-bugs] #10969 [Core Tor/Tor]: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Sep 14 22:44:22 UTC 2017
#10969: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint
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Reporter: asn | Owner:
| mikeperry
Type: defect | Status: closed
Priority: High | Milestone: Tor:
| unspecified
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution: fixed
Keywords: tor-client, tor-guard, XKEYSCORE, | Actual Points:
prop259, SponsorU-deferred, QUICKANT |
Parent ID: | Points: large
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by teor):
Replying to [comment:42 isis]:
> Replying to [comment:41 cypherpunks]:
> > Replying to [comment:40 cypherpunks]:
> > > Hi isis, I'm again reopening this ticket because the fundamental
problem in the title and description ("set of guard nodes can act as a
linkability fingerprint") remains unfixed.
...
> > > I just checked a friend's laptop (Debian stable, tor
0.2.9.11-1~deb9u1) and when it got online it immediately connected to four
guards. I don't know why, but I suspect it's because (like most laptops)
it is sometimes not connected to the internet. (Some time later, it
remained connected to two of them.)
> >
> > Sorry but that doesn't disprove what Isis said, Prop271 was
implemented in Tor 0.3.0.x and not 0.2.9.x which your laptop's friend had.
It is likely that at least 2 of the 4 "guards" are:
* directory authorities
* fallback directory mirrors
* directory guards
That's why your client disconnected from 2 of them after downloading the
consensus, certificates, and descriptors.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10969#comment:43>
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