[tor-bugs] #10969 [Core Tor/Tor]: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint

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#10969: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:
                                                 |  mikeperry
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  reopened
 Priority:  High                                 |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-guard, XKEYSCORE,    |  Actual Points:
  prop259, SponsorU-deferred                     |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  large
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 It's nice that tor sometimes uses only one guard now, but this problem
 still persists (pun intended) on computers that leave a tor process
 running when the network is down such as laptops and cell phones (eg,
 probably most tor users). Look at the tor state file on your laptop, and
 how many guards you have - it's a lot! Look at your network connections
 when you unsleep your laptop after some time, and don't immediately
 connect to the internet. When you do connect, tor will often connect to
 several guards.

 For many users, this could actually be more of a fingerprint than simply
 using a popular VPN provider. Please fix this!

 Btw, did anything actually change between asn commenting "switching to one
 entry guard slightly improved the situation, but did not fix the issue.
 The new guard design did not fix the issue either." and nickm closing the
 issue with "Prop271 and its predecessors have made progress here."?

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10969#comment:36>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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