[tor-bugs] #21534 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop" in small networks
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Nov 17 17:31:44 UTC 2017
#21534: "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop" in small networks
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Reporter: teor | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Very High | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.2.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: regression?, guard-selection, | Actual Points:
dirauth |
Parent ID: #21573 | Points: 1
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by dgoulet):
Replying to [comment:8 teor]:
> Authorities do not use guards for anything.
Well they do for couple reason I can find with the logs. First, self
reachability testing, it goes through a 3 path length circuit and thus
requiring a Guard (`consider_testing_reachability()`)
Second, client hidden service preemptive circuit
(`needs_hs_client_circuits()`). This one happens quite a bit when CBT is
learning (#24228).
So what I mean here is that we should definitely investigate why
authorities (so far I can only see them hitting this issue) don't consider
any nodes a Guard and makes them fallback to the entire routerset.
Actually, it is a bit worst then that because of:
{{{
flags &= ~ (CRN_NEED_UPTIME|CRN_NEED_CAPACITY|CRN_NEED_GUARD|
CRN_PREF_ADDR);
choice = router_choose_random_node(
excludedsmartlist, excludedset, flags);
}}}
BUT, as it turns out, this is definitely not the problem of this
ticket....
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21534#comment:9>
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