[tor-bugs] #23863 [Core Tor/Tor]: When our directory guards don't have each others' microdescs, we should mark some dead
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Wed Nov 15 12:45:32 UTC 2017
#23863: When our directory guards don't have each others' microdescs, we should
mark some dead
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Reporter: teor | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.2.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor:
| 0.3.0.6
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #21969 | Points: 1
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by asn):
Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
> Here's what we could do:
> 1. Try some directory mirrors
> 2. Try a fallback
> 3. Try an authority
> 4. If we still don't have mds for one or more primary guards, mark them
dead until the next consensus
>
> This deals with the scenario where:
> 1. Authorities make new consensus with new mds (hh:00)
> 2. Client bootstraps and downloads consensus from authorities (either at
random because they are part of the fallback list, or due to options)
> 3. Client chooses directory guards
> 4. Client tries directory guards for new mds
> 5. Directory guards are waiting for a random time between hh:00 and
hh:30 to fetch new consensus and new mds. See
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n3240
Seems to me that the ways to deal with the edge case you describe above
are:
a) Eventually clients try authorities to fetch mds if all else fails (bad
for the health of dirauths). I think that's what you suggested basically.
b) We remove dirauths from the fallback list (any drawback?)
c) We make dirservers fetch new consensuses/mds much faster than 30mins
delay (bad for health of dirauths).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23863#comment:2>
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