[tor-bugs] #15618 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as rendevous (pending)

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#15618: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as
rendevous (pending)
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 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs needs-insight needs-          |  Actual Points:
  diagnosis                                      |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by s7r):

 Replying to [comment:34 dgoulet]:
 > Hey s7r! You seems to have DEBUG logs there, you think you can attach
 them (or send them to me private if sensitive) to me. I would like to see
 a bit more of the inners of tor service side for this?
 >

 Yes I have :) been hunting this for some time now. Was lucky to catch it
 live so immediately switched to debug log level. Got about 2 GB of debug
 logs (uncompressed).

 I will send them to you via a secure channel, first because they might be
 sensitive for whoever was using this relay and second because I feel
 something very strange is going on and I don't want to tip anyone off
 which relays keep eyes on this.

 > The fact that we see that "sometimes" and we see it in burst tells me
 that it is likely someone doing that either on purpose or a VERY buggy
 implementation. The tor client can't open 300 circuit to a service in a
 relatively short amount of time and all have the bug for those... seems
 VERY unlikely, we would see that more often.
 >
 > Those 300 warnings are spread out how over time?

 Indeed I would say VERY VERY unlikely. It's maybe more than that, in less
 than 24 hours.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15618#comment:35>
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