[tor-bugs] #21994 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Consensus Health: what is the distribution of a bandwidth authority's measurements?
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Mon May 1 03:24:37 UTC 2017
#21994: Consensus Health: what is the distribution of a bandwidth authority's
measurements?
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Reporter: teor | Owner: tom
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: Very Low | Milestone:
Component: Metrics/Consensus Health | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by teor):
Replying to [comment:4 tom]:
> So I'm not sure exactly ewhat this is asking for, or how to implement
it. But as far as bwauth debugging information, what I have
wanted/envisioned are the following:
>
> 1. A graph on Atlas, per-relay, that shows each bwauth's votes for that
relay over time
> 2. Something (maybe a graph) on Atlas, per-relay, that shows which
scanner the bwauth made the measurement on
> 3. A series of graphs that shows below/median/above bwauth buckets for
relays where each graph only applies to one country's relays.
> 4. A graph or series of graphs that shows bwauth variance on relays per-
country.
>
>
> (1) is for relay operators to understand why their bandwidth usage may
have changed without requiring them to do some ugly consensus/vote
grepping. But it requires changes to OnionOO and Atlas.
>
> (2) is also for relay operators, but also bwauth operators, to confirm
that sometimes relays slip between scanner cracks. To perform the analysis
at all, bwauth's need to apply this patch:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/commit/?id=7e4ef735858acf5d2fbb183b6f8418b7fc2b364a
To get it into Atlas, we need the data in OnionOO, and to get the data
into OnionOO we need it in Collector, (#21378) and to get it into
Collector we need it exposed by the bwauths (#21377).
>
> (3) Should confirm (or reject) the hypothesis that some bwauths make
more high or low measurements because their geographic location hurts or
helps them measure a disproportionate amount of the network.
>
> (4) Should confirm (or reject) the hypothesis that maybe, just maybe,
our bwauths tend to agree with similarly-located bwauths for similarly-
located relays.
These seem like great ideas.
Which do you think we should do first?
> I'm not sure if any of those is what you said though.
I think your suggestions are better than mine.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21994#comment:5>
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