[tor-bugs] #21615 [Metrics/Atlas]: Use hashed fingerprint in all lookups
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Thu Mar 2 15:37:36 UTC 2017
#21615: Use hashed fingerprint in all lookups
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Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: irl
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_information
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Metrics/Atlas | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Changes (by irl):
* status: new => needs_information
* type: defect => enhancement
Comment:
Atlas doesn't claim to hash fingerprints and we instead provide
instructions on how to look up bridges using the hashed fingerprint. I'm
not convinced this is a defect, as clearly lookups using fingerprints
work.
Is Onionoo generally happy to respond to hashed fingerprints in place of
fingerprints for both relays and bridges then? What is the gain for this
over the loss that a bridge fingerprint could be entered into the browser
and perhaps leaked?
I'm not saying it's a bad idea, I'm saying I'm not sure I understand the
motivation yet.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21615#comment:1>
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