[tor-bugs] #22400 [Core Tor/Tor]: We bootstrap from different primary guards when we start with a non-live consensus and not enough guards in the state file
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Jun 22 14:28:03 UTC 2017
#22400: We bootstrap from different primary guards when we start with a non-live
consensus and not enough guards in the state file
-----------------------------------------------+---------------------------
Reporter: arma | Owner: nickm
Type: defect | Status:
| merge_ready
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.1.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor:
| 0.3.0.7
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-client tor-guard 030-backport | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points: 3
Reviewer: asn | Sponsor:
-----------------------------------------------+---------------------------
Changes (by asn):
* status: needs_review => merge_ready
Comment:
Replying to [comment:16 nickm]:
> I think we do need both checks; without a live consensus, we don't want
to expand the list _or_ change its members' status.
>
> The checks are slightly different; for expand it was "reasonably live"
and for change status it's "live". I think that maybe they should both
become "live"; let's try that.
>
> What do you think of the commit I just added to the branch?
Makes sense. I like it more this way and less code dup.
I tested it with an old consensus from collector, and tor correctly
declined to add any guards to the sampled set before fetching a new
consensus.
Marking this branch as `merge_ready`.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22400#comment:17>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
More information about the tor-bugs
mailing list