[tor-bugs] #24506 [Core Tor/Torflow]: Move some bandwidth authority servers to a CDN
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Wed Dec 20 21:05:41 UTC 2017
#24506: Move some bandwidth authority servers to a CDN
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Reporter: teor | Owner: tom
Type: task | Status: needs_information
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Core Tor/Torflow | Version:
Severity: Major | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-bwauth | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #24499 | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by teor):
Thanks Tom!
A 15% increase in the differences between bandwidth authorities seems
reasonable for such a major change,
Are you only using fastly? Or are you using fastly alongside your existing
server?
Replying to [comment:6 mikeperry]:
> FWIW, I think a better approach is to ensure we are getting the
diversity we need by specifying a list of mirrors in specific geographic
locations.
We can use one or more CDNs to cover some geographic locations, and
specifically set up servers in other locations that aren't covered by the
CDNs.
> If we can somehow specify which location that the CDN always uses for
us, rather than having it picking the closest one to whichever exit, that
would be better IMO. See also #24674.
Fastly does not have this feature: it only allows us to select between US-
EU POPs, and all POPs.
Can you explain why choosing the nearest server is a bad thing?
If our goal is to provide each client with approximately the same
bandwidth regardless of path, then we should include paths that clients
typically use. This includes downloads from CDNs. And it probably does
include a bias towards the US and EU, because many websites are hosted
there, or are hosted on CDNs that have a bias towards there. (But maybe
not a bias that is as extreme as the one we have right now.)
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24506#comment:7>
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