[tor-bugs] #15251 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor support starting with 10.000 Tor Hidden Service
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Dec 1 10:15:35 UTC 2017
#15251: Make tor support starting with 10.000 Tor Hidden Service
------------------------------------------+--------------------------------
Reporter: naif | Owner: (none)
Type: task | Status: new
Priority: Low | Milestone: Tor:
| unspecified
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor:
| unspecified
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-hs, scalability, tor-dos | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points: 10
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
------------------------------------------+--------------------------------
Comment (by teor):
Replying to [comment:16 naif]:
> @teor do you think that Tor2webMode 1 (that require compile-time flags)
will make connections going to HSDir to become 1-hop only?
> Ref: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2553
>
> That way the single-onion will also make outgoing "single-hop"
connections for the connections to HSDirs ?
Don't do this. Connecting to HSDirs over a 1-hop path allows HSDirs to
selectively deny service to clients and onion services based on their IP
address. This is why single onion services connect over a 3-hop path.
If you have this many onion services on a tor instance, it will need to be
connected to most relays anyway. If you use a single onion service, it
won't use fixed guards, so it will spread the HSDir circuit load over the
entire network.
Using single-hop paths for HSDirs is a bug in Tor2web that we plan to fix
in #20104.
Also, we plan on removing Tor2web in a few years time when we remove v2
onion services. Tor2web isn't well tested or supported.
Also, have you considered using subdomains on a few onion services, rather
than trying to set up 10,000?
Or do you need the authentication to each individual entity?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15251#comment:17>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
More information about the tor-bugs
mailing list