[tor-bugs] #14881 [Core Tor/Tor]: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory footer

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#14881: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory
footer
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  robgjansen                           |          Owner:  pastly
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,       |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, tor-sponsorU-orphan,             |
  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604, nickm-           |
  deferred-20161005, review-group-10             |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  3
 Reviewer:  mikeperry                            |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  SponsorU-can
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:40 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:39 pastly]:
 > > ...
 > > - 1/10000 does not sound like a lot to me. If this is a big enough
 concern, we'll have to figure something else out.
 >
 > I'm not worried about the inaccuracy, but I'd like to know what the
 impact is - where does the extra weight change which nodes we choose, and
 how often? Which nodes get chosen more often because of it?

 For the record, this is the impact of this patch in the public Tor
 network:
 * each category gains a very small increment, which has negligible impact
 on the final weights,
 And on very small or very new Tor networks:
 * each category is weighted at least 1, even if there are no relays for
 that category. This may be good, because it allows the calculation to
 proceed. But it might also make some cases unreachable (if they rely on
 zero values), or add weight for things that aren't there.

 We should run this consensus method on the tor test network before the
 0.3.0 Tor release.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14881#comment:57>
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