[tor-bugs] #19664 [Core Tor/Tor]: IPv6-only Tor2web should use a 3-hop path on unreachable or failed intro or rend (was: IPv6-only Tor2web: Hidden services should choose an IPv6-capable intro point)

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Nov 15 23:41:32 UTC 2016


#19664: IPv6-only Tor2web should use a 3-hop path on unreachable or failed intro or
rend
-----------------------------+------------------------------
 Reporter:  teor             |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement      |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Low              |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor     |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal           |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor2web  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                   |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                   |        Sponsor:
-----------------------------+------------------------------
Changes (by teor):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


Old description:

> This enables IPv6-only Tor2web instances, at the cost of putting slightly
> more load on dual-stack relays.
>
> (If 25% of relays are dual-stack, the chance that no relays out of 6 will
> be dual-stack is about 10%. So this is only a small increase in load.)

New description:

 Just like single onion services, tor2web should use a 3-hop path if the
 intro or rend point is unreachable (using ReachableAddresses), or retry a
 3-hop path if the connection fails.

 This is more robust than placing requirements on hidden service intro
 point selection.

 Was:
 ~~IPv6-only Tor2web: Hidden services should choose an IPv6-capable intro
 point~~
 ~~This enables IPv6-only Tor2web instances, at the cost of putting
 slightly more load on dual-stack relays.

 (If 25% of relays are dual-stack, the chance that no relays out of 6 will
 be dual-stack is about 10%. So this is only a small increase in load.)~~

--

Comment:

 Hmm, I think we actually fixed

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19664#comment:3>
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