[tor-bugs] #19200 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTML5 video not blocked with placeholder, plays automatically
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Fri Jul 22 09:18:12 UTC 2016
#19200: HTML5 video not blocked with placeholder, plays automatically
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Reporter: potato | Owner: tbb-
Type: defect | team
Priority: High | Status:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | needs_information
Severity: Major | Milestone:
Keywords: tbb-security-slider, | Version:
tbb-6.0-issues, GeorgKoppen201607, | Resolution:
TorBrowserTeam201607 | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Changes (by gk):
* status: needs_revision => needs_information
Comment:
Replying to [comment:16 ma1]:
> Mediasource is quite a hairy problem.
>
> The reason why ClickToPlay cannot work the way it does for "normal"
videos is because there's no general way to identify the actual origin of
the stream that is going to be played: in facts, the data can be generated
on the fly by JavaScript code on the page and can actually come from
anywhere (XMLHttpRequest, fetch(), random numbers, images whose bits are
read using the canvas API, user input, whatever).
>
> Therefore the only meaningful "subject of trust" can be '''page''''s
origin: trying to put individual mediasource elements behind ClickToPlay
is impossible (since the data is fetched and/or assembled by scripts, you
are required to reload the page upon placeholder activation, and the
identity of the element to be activated is usually lost, since it's not
bound to any persistent unique URL); furthermore, I doubt it's even useful
from a security standpoint, since you cannot actually tell one instance
from the other.
>
> The only partial work around I can think of is to implement a "special
case" ClickToPlay for MSE, activating all the elements of a certain page
if any placeholder gets clicked (the key would be page's URL, rather than
the non-existent "media URL", and a page reload would occur). Would that
work for you?
We could tried it at least I guess. There was the idea in #19736 to just
set `media.autoplay.enabled` to `false` and be done with it but I assume
that this does not prevent malicious code from exploiting bugs in
Mozilla's media code but that might be worth to double-check. Another
thing I looked at was the Flashstopper extension which at least provides
an interesting way to block audio/video tags until the user does
something. Giorgio, what do you think would be the best road for making
sure we keep our security guarantees and a click-to-play mechanism?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19200#comment:18>
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