[tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Mon Jul 11 04:39:52 UTC 2016
#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
---------------------------------------------+-----------------------------
Reporter: teor | Owner: teor
Type: enhancement | Status:
Priority: High | needs_review
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Milestone: Tor:
Severity: Normal | 0.2.9.x-final
Keywords: rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201607 | Version:
Parent ID: | Resolution:
Reviewer: dgoulet | Actual Points:
| Points: 6
| Sponsor:
---------------------------------------------+-----------------------------
Changes (by teor):
* status: needs_revision => needs_review
Comment:
I commented on the review.
And I added commits to the branch feature-17178-v4.
Only one outstanding question:
David Goulet @dgoulet commented 3 days ago Master
So hrm... now services with Tor2web compiled in have now single hop?
Tim Wilson-Brown @teor commented 21 minutes ago
Yes, if you configure non-anonymous Single Onion or Tor2web, you can also
configure the other one. And if you configure anonymous Hidden Service,
you can also configure Anonymous Client. But you can't mix non-anonymous
and anonymous.
Is there some scenario you'd like us to prevent here?
I am happy to split the option check into
rend_allow_direct_connection_single_onion() and
rend_allow_direct_connection_tor2web(), if you think that would be
clearer. But it might be more confusing - most of the time we check if
connections are one-hop, we actually want to check if it's either tor2web
or single onion.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17178#comment:51>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
More information about the tor-bugs
mailing list