[tor-bugs] #17945 [Tor]: Stop Tor2Web connecting to (Rendezvous) Single Onion Services

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#17945: Stop Tor2Web connecting to (Rendezvous) Single Onion Services
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 Reporter:  teor                |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement         |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium              |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Tor                 |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal              |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, sos, tor2web  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17178              |         Points:
  Sponsor:                      |
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Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  rsos, sos => rsos, sos, tor2web


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:17945 teor]:
 > Tor2Web clients make a one-hop connection to the rendezvous point.
 Rendezvous Single Onion Services also make a one-hop connection to the
 rendezvous point. (Single Onion Services expect a client to make an extend
 request to the Single Onion Service at the end of a 3-hop path.)
 > ...
 > For Rendezvous Single Onion Services, I don't know how to prevent this
 happening. (Should the rendezvous point intervene? Should we add something
 to the RSOS descriptor?)

 The rendezvous point (and possibly the introduction point) could terminate
 the connection if it has a single hop on both ends. This seems to be the
 most correct option.

 RSOS descriptors could claim to be a RSOS, and then Tor2web can avoid
 connecting to the RSOS. But this provides a generic method for hidden
 services to block Tor2web. I'm not sure we want that, and I don't know if
 all Tor2web operators would enable the feature.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17945#comment:1>
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