[tor-bugs] #7003 [Core Tor/Tor]: Wipe relay key material from memory on common crash conditions

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#7003: Wipe relay key material from memory on common crash conditions
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 Reporter:  mikeperry                            |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:  new
 Priority:  High                                 |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  small-feature, tor-relay, intro,     |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612                      |
Parent ID:  #5456                                |         Points:  medium
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by cypherpunks):

 How much sensitive material is there? Just a shot in the dark, but perhaps
 the material could be encrypted in order to keep the amount of time it's
 decrypted very short, so all it takes is wiping the master key from memory
 to make the rest of the encrypted sensitive material in memory unreadable.
 When the process is in an undefined state (according to POSIX, `SIGSEGV`
 not induced by `raise(3)` or `kill(2)` puts a process in such a state), it
 would be much easier for it to wipe a single page than it would be to find
 and wipe a time-varying amount of memory in multiple locations.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7003#comment:13>
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