[tor-bugs] #21005 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Enforce Stronger Ciphers in Tor Messenger
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Fri Dec 16 19:13:51 UTC 2016
#21005: Enforce Stronger Ciphers in Tor Messenger
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Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Messenger | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: Tor Messenger | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by arlolra):
Thanks for your pursuit.
> an user should not enforce stronger ciphers by setting a higher security
level
Right, I reconsidered that here,
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-messenger-
030b1-released#comment-220691
As an experiment, I changed my settings to what you suggested above.
When connecting to my accounts, I was presented with,
{{{
Error: An error occurred during a connection to
freenodeok2gncmy.onion:6697.
Cannot communicate securely with peer: no common encryption algorithm(s).
Error code: <a id="errorCode"
title="SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP">SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP</a>
}}}
That's freenode's onion (we need to consider IRC as well).
Running `nmap -Pn --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 6697 chat.freenode.net`
gives me,
{{{
| TLSv1.2:
| ciphers:
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (dh 2048) - A
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (dh 2048) - A
}}}
The first one on the list is recommended in RFC 7525, but not supported in
NSS, see ticket:18129#comment:11
> or deliberately use the ... server
which would mean enabling `security.ssl3.dhe_rsa_aes_256_sha` as a
distinguisher. Someone suggested this isn't an issue because,
> your email/xmpp provider already "knows" you
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-messenger-
030b1-released#comment-221194
but that's a global setting that's going to be advertised to all
connections and might not play well with temporary accounts in #16606
On another note about the `security.ssl3.*`, the rc4 suites aren't enabled
despite saying `true`. See ticket:18129#comment:7 for the client hello.
Anyways, I think I agree with the spirit of the ticket.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21005#comment:1>
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