[tor-bugs] #20761 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Tor Browser 6.5a4 is ignoring additional SocksPorts

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#20761: Tor Browser 6.5a4 is ignoring additional SocksPorts
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 Reporter:  gk                         |          Owner:  mcs
     Type:  defect                     |         Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium                     |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                     |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201612R      |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                             |         Points:
 Reviewer:                             |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:15 mcs]:
 > There are two commits on the following branch that need review:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 launcher.git/log/?h=bug20761-01
 >
 > The older commit switches the default to TCP listeners.
 > The second commit implements our Proposal 2 from comment:12.

 Looks good to me. Just one nit: `if any,` -> `if any.`.

 > Switching back to TCP listeners after running with use_ipc = true may
 still require some manual cleanup by the user (e.g., if the unix: paths
 were written to their torrc), but I don't think we can avoid that until we
 fix #20906.

 Hm. I hit that one as well when testing in the hardened build I am
 currently using. IIRC this is only an issue if one has clicked on "OK" on
 the network settings dialog once, right? After removing the problematic
 lines everything works fine. I tested in a clean alpha and even a clean
 stable and in both scenarios we are using TCP + the old behavior is
 visible. Good. Now, the question I am wrestling with is: "Could that be
 testing enough or do we really need to break a bunch of alpha users by
 disabling Unix domain sockets just to enable them in 7.0a1 again?"

 I wonder how much testing we are actually getting for the scenarios we are
 caring about if we shipped that patch in the next alpha:

 1) We don't get an idea about what is happening during an update from
 6.0.x to 6.5 with IPC disabled as the current alpha has it enabled.
 2) We would get an idea about what is happening if a user downloads a
 fresh Tor Browser and is using that one.
 3) We would get an idea about whether Tor Browser is behaving well over a
 longer period of time with IPC being disabled.

 Plus we get
 4) We get an idea about scenarios that won't happen with 6.5 being shipped
 (i.e. the breakage we are talking about).

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20761#comment:17>
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