[tor-bugs] #19875 [Core Tor/Tor]: shuffle our bridges when we load them from config
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Sat Aug 13 04:09:20 UTC 2016
#19875: shuffle our bridges when we load them from config
--------------------------+------------------------------
Reporter: arma | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.???
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: easy | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
--------------------------+------------------------------
Comment (by isis):
Replying to [comment:3 hdevalence]:
> Hi, a first patch is here:
https://code.ciph.re/hdevalence/tor/commit/4fda92e51bc5c69f5ba4c19c22184a1e0b87d9c1
>
> I'm not really sure what the right way to write a test for it is -- the
description of the intended behaviour above relies on a bunch of other
parts of tor behaving in a certain way (e.g., interaction with the
statefile). Testing just that `shuffle_bridge_list()` actually shuffles
the list doesn't ensure the behaviour in the top of the ticket -- is that
OK?
Tor's testing/mocking system takes a tiny bit of learning, but not too
much. I'm happy to help you write tests, or write them for you if you'd
prefer to move on to working on something else.
> Also, should this behaviour be configurable, instead of always-on? Do
people rely on bridge ordering?
It seems like a good idea to make it configurable, but off-by-default.
This way, we can preserve the currently expected behaviour without
surprising users. We can revert my patch in #18113 and just flip the
config variable on for TB users, and, likewise, non-TB users who really
want this can opt-in to enabling it.
(I'm willing to be talked out of this viewpoint if there's good reason to
do otherwise.)
Regardless of whether it should be on or off by default, it seems like
it's probably a good idea to have a config variable.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19875#comment:5>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
More information about the tor-bugs
mailing list