[tor-bugs] #18361 [Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
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 Reporter:  ioerror                       |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  enhancement                   |         Status:  new
 Priority:  High                          |      Milestone:
Component:  Tor Browser                   |        Version:
 Severity:  Critical                      |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, privacy, anonymity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                                |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                |        Sponsor:  None
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Comment (by jgrahamc):

 Replying to [comment:222 tne]:
 > Exactly; it's "part of" your solution. In and of itself, it isn't
 sufficient. This means you'll continue to rely on IP rep. Nobody likes
 that, not even you I reckon, but it's the best you have right now.

 Every web property of significant size uses some sort of IP-based
 reputation. It's one way web sites deal with abuse (sometimes it's super-
 manual: web site admins look at logs and restrict certain IPs). No plan to
 ditch IP reputation, but CloudFlare likes to make continuous improvements
 and I think this is an area where we can do that.

 > Dealing with that reality, I think there are ways to reduce the pain in
 specific areas (e.g. sites that are not being "actively abused") and that
 are worth exploring. Would you comment on that?

 I need to think about it. I don't have a ready answer to whether that
 would work. Will do some internal investigation.

 > I know, I've been following the discussion. I probably should have
 thanked you and your team for that beforehand. As I said, I even benefit
 from some of those changes, and that's great.

 Good, I'm glad to hear the changes we are making are helping.

 > Assumption: By "''It's better to think at an individual request level
 and ask "Does this request indicate abuse?" and then decide what to do. Of
 course, we can take into account other things as well, but [...]''" you
 didn't really mean that you were aiming to do that exclusively, as that
 would prevent you from using an IP reputation system (which uses data
 besides the isolated request, i.e. reputation scores gathered via other
 customer sites). I interpreted it like that however, and we might have
 talked past each other. If that's correct, what I said will make more
 sense.

 It's more a question of how you mix this stuff. Suppose you have a bad IP
 reputation for some IP, plus you look at the request and it looks it might
 be SQLi then you impede that, but if you see a request and it's clean then
 you downplay the IP reputation and let the request through. Equally you
 have a good IP and it's certain it's a known exploit, you block that.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18361#comment:223>
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