[tor-bugs] #15254 [Tor]: Enable hidden-service statistics by default

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#15254: Enable hidden-service statistics by default
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     Reporter:  dgoulet  |      Owner:
         Type:           |     Status:  reopened
  enhancement            |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
     Priority:  major    |    Version:
    Component:  Tor      |   Keywords:  SponsorR tor-hs stats
   Resolution:           |  TorCoreTeam201509 PostFreeze027
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:
       Points:           |
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Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:16 asn]:
 > - Both of these stats [https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-frac-
 reporting.html?graph=hidserv-frac-
 reporting&start=2014-06-11&end=2015-09-09 have very low coverage right
 now].The HSDir stat for example is about to go below 1% coverage which
 means that it will stop working (we require at least 1% coverage for these
 stats).
 That threshold could have been more or less than 1% depending on how many
 enabled them initially. The extrapolated values from 1% aren't that far
 away from the values extrapolated from a single relay.

 >   This is because not many relay operators are running the stats and
 some that did have disabled them because they didn't know if they work or
 if they are useful.
 Why do more relays enable one of the stats than the other?

 >   By turning this on by default, we stop hunting down relay operators to
 ask them to enable stats.
 IMO there isn't a problem with sending the same email as before.

 > - I'm also afraid that this low coverage might be causing our
 extrapolations to lie. For example, I could imagine that the bandwidth
 graph does not work very well with that low coverage since most clients
 that cause lots of traffic connect to relays that are not reporting
 statistics. This might be why the spikes are so big on that graph, since
 some days we might be lucky and get those busy clients in the stats. I
 think it will be very interesting to see how the graph develops when more
 of the network reports these stats (and we stop relying so much on our
 crazy extrapolation from 1%).
 Those relays handle more than a 1% share of bandwidth. The graphs show
 those extrapolated values have varied relatively little over time. Spikes
 can have many causes. The values are not far off the real ones, unless
 they're being counted wrong, but they're also in rough agreement with
 other estimates by unrelated methods.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15254#comment:26>
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