[tor-bugs] #16756 [Pluggable transport]: Formalize and document what it takes for a PT to get deployed.
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Wed Sep 23 19:13:28 UTC 2015
#16756: Formalize and document what it takes for a PT to get deployed.
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Reporter: yawning | Owner: yawning
Type: task | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Pluggable transport | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: SponsorS
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by dcf):
Replying to [comment:5 mikeperry]:
> I am deeply wary of the fast-and-loose flashproxy model for lots of
reasons. If the introducer can't manage to authenticate itself, and it
can't tell you how to authenticate your traffic to the flashproxy bridges
it gives you, then long-term I am against it and anything that behaves
like it. In fact, I would be in favor of killing it until we can fix these
issues, especially if we're thinking of trimming down the supported PT
list anyway. I really, really don't want a future WebRTC-based version of
flashproxy to end up as such an unauthenticated free-for-all mess, for
example.
I'm fine with removing flashproxy from the bundle.
Mike, the JavaScript flash proxies are just dumb pipes to the Tor bridge.
They don't have an identity that is separately authenticated. You still
authenticate the Tor bridge, as long as you have a fingerprint on the
bridge line (which we do now).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16756#comment:8>
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