[tor-bugs] #16943 [Tor]: Implement prop250 (Random Number Generation During Tor Voting)

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#16943: Implement prop250 (Random Number Generation During Tor Voting)
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 Reporter:  asn       |          Owner:
     Type:  defect    |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium    |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Tor       |        Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs    |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #8244     |         Points:  large
  Sponsor:  SponsorR  |
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Comment (by dgoulet):

 Latest branch with code rebased on master and improvement: `prop250_v4`.

 This branch has few new things.

 * A random number is now always hashed `H(RN)` so we avoid leaking bytes
 from our PRNG to the network.
 * Add SR flag to the vote indicating if the vote participates in the
 protocol
 * Parse votes and populate an object in the `networkstatus_t` object. Once
 done, we only handle those commits once we are sure a vote is valid and
 from known authority (we weren't doing that before).
 * Refactor some functions to be able to support the last bullet above and
 improve naming on some functions.

 Few things are missing that I'll get to it:

 * Consensus params for the number of participants.
 * Torrc option to disable SR support (basically making the dirauth not
 adding the SR flag to the vote).
 * Some issues with the disk state also because we know rely on the RSA
 fingerprint of a dirauth.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16943#comment:15>
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