[tor-bugs] #17178 [Tor]: Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Fri Nov 6 13:41:22 UTC 2015
#17178: Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
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Reporter: teor | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_revision
Priority: High | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: 028-triaged tor-hs | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points: large
Sponsor: SponsorU |
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Comment (by asn):
Replying to [comment:14 teor]:
> Replying to [comment:13 asn]:
> > Hello teor, what can I do here to help? What's the current status
here? I can spend a few hours this week on this ticket.
>
> The code works and has been tested using chutney.
>
> It doesn't behave correctly when
RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer Is changed at runtime
(using torrc and a HUP, or over the control port). The current code
attempts to re-use introduction points and introduction point circuits
after a HUP. But if the value of
RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer has changed, the circuits
are the wrong length. Tor should close the circuits and discard the intro
points (this needs to be coded), then post a fresh descriptor (this likely
already happens anyway after a config change).
>
This can be done yes, but it's some moderate engineering complexity. Are
we sure we want `RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer` to be
hotpluggable like that? We think HS operators would enjoy that, or can we
just fail and warn the user if `RSOS` was enabled after a HUP?
And also there is the opposite direction. What happens if RSOS is disabled
after a HUP? Then you need to kill all 1-hop circuits and make 3-hop ones?
Do we want people to think it's so easy to switch between these two modes?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17178#comment:15>
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