[tor-bugs] #15968 [BridgeDB]: Add a "Content-Security-Policy" header to BridgeDB's HTTPS Distributor
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Sat May 9 07:48:50 UTC 2015
#15968: Add a "Content-Security-Policy" header to BridgeDB's HTTPS Distributor
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Reporter: isis | Owner: isis
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: major | Milestone:
Component: BridgeDB | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: bridgedb-https security
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by bastik):
>a malicious bridge could specify in its Pluggable Transport arguments in
its extrainfo descriptor
I assume it is hard to sanitize the descriptor without breaking anything.
Although it would benefit all users if script tags would be filtered out
and pluggable transports don't use them.
>The only downside appears to be that CSP is not implemented in IE (not
until IE10, which apparently has limited support), so all BridgeDB's users
running IE6 and IE7 on WindowsXP boxes in China (there are a lot of these
boxes in China) could still be attacked.
If you had to choose (exclusively) between something that is safe for all
and safe for some it is arguably better to have it safe for all of them.
With every new technology, like DEP, ASLR and CSP, older machines with its
outdated software are left behind.
It is only a downside if it is an option among (many) others. Thus far it
is an improvement over the current status. Users unable to upgrade their
machines to newer OSes and therefore the built-in browser can use
alternative browsers as long as they support those OSes.
Users on older OSes can still use the service as usual, it does not break,
it is not less secure than before. IMO the users on XP should not hinder
the implementation of CSP, as there is no negative impact.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15968#comment:2>
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