[tor-bugs] #15458 [Tor]: Determine optimal circuit usage for Tor Browser

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#15458: Determine optimal circuit usage for Tor Browser
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     Reporter:           |      Owner:
  mikeperry              |     Status:  new
         Type:           |  Milestone:
  enhancement            |    Version:
     Priority:  normal   |   Keywords:  tbb-wants, tor-client needs-
    Component:  Tor      |  proposal
   Resolution:           |  Parent ID:
Actual Points:           |
       Points:           |
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Comment (by mikeperry):

 Some notes for potential proposals:

 On the DontAbandonAlreadySuccessfulCircuits/StrongSocksIsolation side of
 this, one additional property we may want is for Tor to reject stream
 attempts that would be invalid if sent over a currently live circuit with
 the same socks username+password. This would mitigate weird attacks where
 sites can collude with exits to redirect a portion of their traffic over
 to the only exit on the network that allows connections to
 127.23.23.23:25, or similar. It might also ensure that the Torbutton
 circuit display is always correct to the extent that only one circuit was
 used for the site.

 On the TrackIsolationExits side, we'll want to specify what to do about
 cannibalization as well as predictive circuit building, so we can avoid
 both 4 hop circuits as well as latency while waiting for circuit
 construction for as many cases as possible.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15458#comment:6>
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