[tor-bugs] #8244 [Tor]: The HSDirs for a hidden service should not be predictable indefinitely into the future

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#8244: The HSDirs for a hidden service should not be predictable indefinitely into
the future
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     Reporter:  arma     |      Owner:
         Type:           |     Status:  assigned
  enhancement            |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
     Priority:  normal   |    Version:
    Component:  Tor      |   Keywords:  tor-hs, needs-proposal,
   Resolution:           |  026-triaged-1, 027-triaged-1-out
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:  #12424
       Points:           |
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Comment (by kernelcorn):

 There is an estimation of the consensus in my OnioNS paper. My analysis
 found ~8.9 kilobits of entropy based on routers that change some selected
 fields in their descriptors, and 16kb - 28kb of entropy based on routers
 entering and leaving the Tor network. Using the consensus (at least
 cached-microdesc and cached-certs) as a global source of entropy appears
 to be a secure idea. It's also trivial to add more entropy. Although not
 everyone has the same consensus at the same time, they are timestamped, so
 a specific consensus is easy to reference. That's what I'm doing with
 OnioNS anyway.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8244#comment:28>
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