[tor-bugs] #16659 [- Select a component]: TCP Initial Sequence Numbers Leak Host Clock

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#16659: TCP Initial Sequence Numbers Leak Host Clock
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 Reporter:  source                |          Owner:
     Type:  defect                |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal                |      Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |        Version:
 Keywords:                        |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                        |         Points:
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 TCP Sequence Numbers seem to be one more way to leak the host clock on
 GNU/Linux systems. Its the last major vector in the literature thats not
 addressed yet.[1] The kernel embeds the system time in microseconds in TCP
 connections. Some opinions say the TCP ISNs are salted hashes and can't be
 abused but my impression from Steve Murdoch's papers are that its feasible
 and already carried out in his tests. [2][3]

 There is no sysctl option to disable it and it must be patched upstream
 [4][5]

 Nick has done exceptional work to get OpenSSL upstream to throw out
 mandatory timestamping in the protocol. TAILS and Whonix disable TCP
 Timestamps in the kernel sysctl. TCP Timestamps are a different vector
 from TCP ISNs discussed here -  it would be great if upstream kernel
 disables this as well so all distros have it.


 [1]https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/ccs06hotornot.pdf
 [2]http://caia.swin.edu.au/talks/CAIA-TALK-080728A.pdf
 [3]http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/ih05coverttcp.pdf
 [4]https://stackoverflow.com/a/12232126
 [5]http://lxr.free-electrons.com/source/net/core/secure_seq.c?v=3.16

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16659>
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