[tor-bugs] #14101 [Tor]: Client may be forced to choose a certain guard!?

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#14101: Client may be forced to choose a certain guard!?
-------------------------+---------------------
 Reporter:  mzupzyij     |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal       |      Milestone:
Component:  Tor          |        Version:
 Keywords:  guard        |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:               |         Points:
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 Hi!

 I recently heard a talk about deanonymisation attacks against TOR on the
 31C3
 Congress of the Chaos Computer Club.
 After that, a certain question about packets count/timing attacks came to
 my
 mind.

 What about a situation, in which an attacker already knows who he want's
 to
 attack. Maybe he's in the same wireless network or he knows the public IP
 of
 the victim. He just wants to find out, on what websites the victim is
 surfing
 via TOR.

 If the attacker has a way to drop all the packages send by the client when
 connecting to a guard/entry node, he could do this until the client
 chooses an
 evil guard node the attacker is in control of.

 Does TOR currently do anything to handle this?
 Maybe a warning if too many guards are unreachable?

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14101>
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