[tor-bugs] #17178 [Tor]: Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Dec 23 11:26:24 UTC 2015


#17178: Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  teor                                 |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:
 Priority:  High                                 |  needs_revision
Component:  Tor                                  |      Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal                               |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  028-triaged, tor-hs,                 |        Version:
  TorCoreTeam201601                              |     Resolution:
Parent ID:                                       |  Actual Points:
  Sponsor:  SponsorU                             |         Points:  large
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:24 teor]:
 > Reviewing asn's HS/RSOS poisoning changes:
 > * code looks good, but I wonder if we should make it generic, so we can
 use it with single onion services as well, by using more generic terms,
 like SOS and "non-anonymous onion service":
 > {{{
 > #define SOS_POISON_FNAME "non_anonymous_onion_service"
 > }}}
 > * There's a warning for ephemeral RSOS, but I think it's actually an
 acceptable use case. The keys aren't persistent, so there's no issue with
 reuse in anonymous/non-anonymous modes. Maybe make it a log_info and
 remove the "can't be"?
 > {{{
 > log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Ephemeral HS can't be started as RSOS.");
 > }}}
 >

 OK I implemented both of the above changes and pushed them in my branch
 `feature-17178-rsos`.

 Can someone test that ephemeral HSes play nicely with the RSOS feature in
 this latest branch? Will do it myself soon if someone beats me to it.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17178#comment:26>
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