[tor-bugs] #17178 [Tor]: Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Wed Dec 23 11:26:24 UTC 2015
#17178: Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
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Reporter: teor | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status:
Priority: High | needs_revision
Component: Tor | Milestone: Tor:
Severity: Normal | 0.2.8.x-final
Keywords: 028-triaged, tor-hs, | Version:
TorCoreTeam201601 | Resolution:
Parent ID: | Actual Points:
Sponsor: SponsorU | Points: large
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Comment (by asn):
Replying to [comment:24 teor]:
> Reviewing asn's HS/RSOS poisoning changes:
> * code looks good, but I wonder if we should make it generic, so we can
use it with single onion services as well, by using more generic terms,
like SOS and "non-anonymous onion service":
> {{{
> #define SOS_POISON_FNAME "non_anonymous_onion_service"
> }}}
> * There's a warning for ephemeral RSOS, but I think it's actually an
acceptable use case. The keys aren't persistent, so there's no issue with
reuse in anonymous/non-anonymous modes. Maybe make it a log_info and
remove the "can't be"?
> {{{
> log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Ephemeral HS can't be started as RSOS.");
> }}}
>
OK I implemented both of the above changes and pushed them in my branch
`feature-17178-rsos`.
Can someone test that ephemeral HSes play nicely with the RSOS feature in
this latest branch? Will do it myself soon if someone beats me to it.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17178#comment:26>
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