[tor-bugs] #17773 [Tor]: Should clients avoid using guards that lost the Guard flag?
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Thu Dec 17 05:41:07 UTC 2015
#17773: Should clients avoid using guards that lost the Guard flag?
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Reporter: arma | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Sponsor: |
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Comment (by teor):
I think entry_guards_set_from_config() already does something useful - it
places entry nodes without the Guard flag after entry nodes with the Guard
flag:
{{{
} else if (! node->is_possible_guard) {
smartlist_add(worse_entry_nodes, (node_t*)node);
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
/* Now build the new entry_guards list. */
smartlist_clear(entry_guards);
/* First, the previously configured guards that are in EntryNodes. */
smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_on_list);
/* Next, scramble the rest of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */
smartlist_shuffle(entry_nodes);
smartlist_shuffle(worse_entry_nodes);
smartlist_add_all(entry_nodes, worse_entry_nodes);
}}}
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17773#comment:2>
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