[tor-bugs] #16861 [Tor]: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records

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#16861: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records
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     Reporter:  mikeperry    |      Owner:  mikeperry
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  needs_revision
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
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Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 FYI: My questions above still stand, but the following additional issues
 make me think that 0.2.8.x is a better target for this:
 1. Predictive circuit building is causing otherwise unused connections to
 live far longer than I expected in many cases (1.25-1.5 hours). This means
 that the overhead is more like 500KB per connection in the worst case, and
 even with ReducedConnectionPadding, 330KB in the worst case. I think that
 much overhead for mobile is not acceptable without allowing users to opt-
 out.
 2. This probably also means we want the ability for clients to tell relays
 not to pad, or pad less, in case we discover that mobile connections
 should still live a long time, but pad less overall.
 3. I think all of this does mean we want statistics on average ORconn
 lifespan (issue 7 in comment:18), as well as stats on avg per-orconn
 padding, as this will help us tune the defense.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16861#comment:19>
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