[tor-bugs] #15744 [Tor]: Is 16384 introductions a sane limit for IP rotation?
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Aug 21 11:27:17 UTC 2015
#15744: Is 16384 introductions a sane limit for IP rotation?
-------------------------+--------------------------------
Reporter: dgoulet | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: SponsorR, tor-hs
Actual Points: | Parent ID: #15714
Points: |
-------------------------+--------------------------------
Comment (by asn):
We continued our analysis, by setting up a relay that collected
aggregated statistics on established introduction
circuits. Specifically, we collected an aggregated daily histogram of
the number of introductions happening over intro circuits, as well as
the lifetime of intro circuits.
By doing this we were trying to answer the following questions:
Q: What's the average number of introductions happening over intro
circuits? Hidden services used to have a hard limit of about 16k
introductions before rotating the intro circuit. This was recently raised
to a random number around 25k introductions, is this better or is it too
low/high? (#15744)
Q: How is hidden service traffic spread? Is hidden service traffic
concentrated on a few giant services, or is it more evenly spread out?
Q: Are hidden services volatile? Do they stay up for days, or do they
tend to disappear soon after they spawn?
We collected statistics for 23 days. During our measurement period we
encountered about 8000 introduction circuits. You can find our results
here:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/15744
/introduction-circuits-2015-05-19.pdf
https://people.torproject.org/~asn/intro_stats/lifetimes_graph.png
https://people.torproject.org/~asn/intro_stats/intros_graph.png
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15744
- About 80% of introduction circuits see no introductions at all.
90% of introduction circuits see between 0 and 49 introductions during
their lifetime.
- We also see that about 60% of introduction circuits only stay up for
half an hour or less.
- This means that a big number of hidden services are ephemeral.
This is expected since hidden services are still early on
their adoption phase and there are not that many users out there.
This might also be caused by short-living protocols like Ricochet
and Onionshare, or it might be the result of people experimenting
with hidden services.
- We can also see that a non-negligible amount of hidden services have
performed 10k+ introductions, which is close to the old introduction
point rotation limit of 16k. Hence, we believe that raising the
limit (#15745) to about 25k introductions was the correct move.
- Even though there is a hard limit of introductions per circuit, we
see that there are some introduction circuits that have performed
more than 34000 introductions. This should not be possible with any
current version of Tor. We believe that these hidden services are
either using an alternative Tor implementation, or they have modded
their Tor client to allow a greater number of introductions per
circuit.
- We can see that some introduction circuits lasted for 25+ hours. This is
peculiar, since the normal lifetime of introduction circuits is maximum
24 hours. We suspect that features like circuit cannibalization might be
the cause of this behavior, but we need to dig into this more.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15744#comment:16>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
More information about the tor-bugs
mailing list