[tor-bugs] #15513 [Tor]: Investigate lifetime of IPs on Hidden Services
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Sun Apr 12 13:05:48 UTC 2015
#15513: Investigate lifetime of IPs on Hidden Services
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Reporter: donncha | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-hs
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by karsten):
Right, the fifth graph didn't show absolute numbers of relays. I changed
it and made
[https://people.torproject.org/~karsten/volatile/lifetimes-2015-04-12.pdf
updated graphs available].
Here's a more detailed explanation of these five graphs:
1. Lifetime of introduction points: This graph shows the number of hours
between first and last seeing an introduction point in a hidden-service
descriptor published by one of five publicly known services. As expected,
the maximum lifetime of introduction points is 24 hours, with a single
exception of 25 hours which may be the result of truncating minutes of the
hour in descriptor publication times. This graph shows how much lifetime
of introduction points depends on the service, with agorahoo using almost
all of its introduction points for at most one hour.
2. Number of descriptors published per hour, including descriptor
replicas: The second graph shows how many different descriptors a service
publishes per hour. We didn't bother to filter out duplicates from having
fetched both replicas of a descriptor, which is why most numbers in this
graph are multiples of two. This graph shows that four out of five
services published only two descriptors per hour in 90% of cases, with
agorahoo publishing at least four in half of cases. It might even be that
agorahoo was publishing more descriptors that we didn't fetch.
3. Number of distinct introduction points used per hour: This graph
compares all descriptors published by a service in the same hour and
counts how many distinct introduction points they contain. Three out of
five services used only 3 introduction points in 90% of hours, whereas
kpvz7kpm used at least 5 introduction points in 50% of hours. agorahoo
is, again, the exception, with up to 25 different introduction points per
hour in the extreme case.
4. Number of introduction points per descriptor: The fourth graph simply
counts how many introduction points there were contained in a descriptor.
This number was consistently at 3 for the three services that didn't stand
out above. kpvz7kpm did stand out here with using between 4 and 10
introduction points in half of its descriptors as well as agorahoo with up
to 10 introduction points in 10% of descriptors. If additional
introduction points are established as a result of higher load seen by the
service, one might say that kpvz7kpm was under higher load half of the
time whereas agorahoo was under heavy load for only 10% of the time. It
would have been trivial to plot these heavy-load times per service at a
granularity of one hour.
5. Number of introduction points established on the same relay (in the
measurement period): This graph shows to what extent relays are being used
for establishing introduction points. The agorahoo service serves as best
example here: while about half of the about 1300 relays have only been
used a single time for establishing an introduction points, the other half
was used more than once, up to almost 60 established introduction points
on a single relay. This distribution looks plausible, given that tor's
weighting algorithm favors relays based on their consensus weight. It's
more difficult to analyze the other services which have only established a
tiny number of introduction points in the measurement period compared to
agorahoo. On a related note, if services were to change their preferences
for selecting introduction points, that would stand out very clearly in
this graph.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15513#comment:10>
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