[tor-bugs] #13447 [Tor]: Don't build introduction circuits until we know we can build circuits
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Mon Oct 20 18:54:20 UTC 2014
#13447: Don't build introduction circuits until we know we can build circuits
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Reporter: akwizgran | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_review
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-hs
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by akwizgran):
Hi, I've tested this on two ARM-based Android devices - each device
publishes a hidden service and connects to the service published by the
other device. The controller sets DisableNetwork 1 in response to losing
internet connectivity and DisableNetwork 0 when connectivity is restored.
By adding some log statements to rendservice.c (not included in the final
patch) I could see that the devices were trying to build intro circuits as
soon as DisableNetwork was set to 0. This coincided with trying to open
the first OR connection, so the circuits failed, up to the limit of 10
attempts (MAX_INTRO_CIRCS_PER_PERIOD) at which point no further attempts
were made for 5 minutes (INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD). After 5 minutes the
next round of intro circuits succeeded. With this patch the first round is
deferred until the guard connection has come up, so the first round
succeeds.
I haven't tested this patch on a relay yet.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13447#comment:3>
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