[tor-bugs] #10676 [Tor]: Verify urandom-style RNG is seeded before generating ID keys

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#10676: Verify urandom-style RNG is seeded before generating ID keys
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     Reporter:  nickm        |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  needs_revision
     Priority:  major        |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:  tor-server rng urandom startup
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
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Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final => Tor: 0.2.6.x-final


Comment:

 >I think this relates to cypherpunks comment above and I don't have any
 references of my own handy, but it is not sufficient for /dev/random to
 *think* it has or has had entropy.

 Right; the point of this patch series is not to try for a user-space
 solution to all possible or historical kernel breakage.  Instead, I'm
 trying to improve our behavior in the presence of the kinds of kernel
 breakage where /dev/urandom does not yet have sufficient entropy, and the
 kernel knows it doesn't, but returns data anyway.

 Still, this isn't on-deadline for 0.2.5.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10676#comment:11>
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