[tor-bugs] #12466 [Tor]: Possible primary guard node skip when some guards are down
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Sun Jun 29 09:01:47 UTC 2014
#12466: Possible primary guard node skip when some guards are down
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Reporter: asn | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-guard tor-client
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by asn):
I think part of the problem here, is that when we think of
`NumEntryGuards` being `3`, we think "There should only be 3 possible
first-hops for any circuit.".
However, when `choose_random_entry_impl()` thinks of `NumEntryGuards`
being `3`, it thinks "For every entry guard selection for a circuit, I
need to have 3 possible node picks.".
Since different circuits have different requirements (others need `Stable`
nodes, other need `DirCache`, etc.), these two definitions are not
equivalent (since the first 3 nodes in our entry guard list will probably
not fulfil all those requirements.).
I call the first 3 nodes in our entry guard list the `primary guards` of a
client. The rest of the nodes in our entry guard are auxiliary guards,
used only when the first 3 cannot satisfy us (because they are down, or
because they are not `Fast`, etc.).
To bring Tor's behavior closer to the first definition (which seems like
the right one), maybe it makes sense to always try to pick a primary guard
if it satisfies the requirements of a circuit, even if we don't have 3
possible choices to pick from.
Unfortunately, the implementation of this idea does not sound that easy,
since the concept of a `primary guard` is not so clear in real life. For
example, is a node that has been down for 2 weeks still a primary guard
(even if it's on the top of the entry guard list)?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12466#comment:1>
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