[tor-bugs] #6088 [Tor]: Gather data about possible transition to 2048bit RSA/DHE
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Thu Jun 19 14:26:53 UTC 2014
#6088: Gather data about possible transition to 2048bit RSA/DHE
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
Reporter: ioerror | Owner: ioerror
Type: | Status: new
enhancement | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
Priority: normal | Version: Tor: unspecified
Component: Tor | Keywords: tor-relay needs-analysis needs-
Resolution: | proposal 026-triaged-1
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
Changes (by nickm):
* keywords: tor-relay needs-analysis needs-proposal => tor-relay needs-
analysis needs-proposal 026-triaged-1
Comment:
I think all that is left here is switching from 1024-bit RSA link keys to
2048-bit RSA link keys. According to some surveys, 2048-bit link keys are
already in a majority for websites, so this won't be a huge deal.
P256 ECDHE is fairly common in the wild, but 2048-bit DHE is quite rare.
I did some quick experiments to tell whether changing to better
certificates would break compatibility. It appears that 0.2.2 and later
all work just fine with 2048-bit link keys.
It's possible, however, that we want to want to do more here. It's pretty
unusual to have a 2048-bit certificate that's signed by a 1024-bit key.
So when we send out our link certificate for TLS, we want to have a dummy
2048-bit key sign it -- and we want to present a real identity-key-signed
link cert when we do our CERTS cells.
I've verified that doing *that* works just fine with 0.2.3 and later, and
hacked up a chutney network to the point where it kinda just works with
the v2 handshake. I think I have the v1 handshake working too, but I
haven't tested it.
(I don't know whether we care very much about v2 and v1, or whether we're
deprecating them... but at least, using 2048-bit link keys signed by
2048-bit temporary keys won't force us to deprecate them.)
My hacks are in a branch "ticket6088_hax". They need more work to get
applied. There's not much point applying them without also doing proposal
220.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6088#comment:15>
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