[tor-bugs] #12595 [Tor]: Think of better data structures for guard nodes
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Thu Jul 31 14:32:10 UTC 2014
#12595: Think of better data structures for guard nodes
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Reporter: asn | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-guard
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by asn):
Replying to [comment:5 asn]:
>
> There are various kludg!^Wways to fix this issue. Some ideas:
>
> a) Everytime we manage to connect to a guard, if it's not the first
guard in our list, we mark all previous guards as retriable, and try from
the top.
> b) Everytime we manage to connect to a guard, if we have previously
failed to connect to other guards in this session, we mark '''all other
guards''' as retriable and try from the top.
> c) Everytime we manage to connect to a guard, if we have previously
failed to connect to a guard in this session, we mark '''those previously
attempted''' guards as retriable and try from the top.
>
> All the above ideas will also need some way to stop them from infinite
looping.
>
FWIW, the kludges above are needed because we don't have a "Is my network
down?" primitive.
And since we don't have such a primitive, we can't distinguish between
"Guard is marked unreachable because it was down" and "Guard is marked
unrecahble because the network was down". If we could distinguish between
those two cases, then this task would be much easier.
Is there a way to build such a primitive in a secure and scaleable
fashion? For example, we could imagine that clients ping the authorities
to check if their network is up. But this puts more load to the
authorities and it doesn't scale well.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12595#comment:6>
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