[tor-bugs] #8243 [Tor]: Getting the HSDir flag should require more effort

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Jul 10 17:04:30 UTC 2014


#8243: Getting the HSDir flag should require more effort
-----------------------------+-------------------------------------
     Reporter:  arma         |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:  tor-auth needs-proposal
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
-----------------------------+-------------------------------------

Comment (by special):

 Replying to [comment:8 naif]:
 > What if Tor Relay that can became HSDir only if:
 > - that are part of a Family of at least X nodes
 > - that have an uptime of at least Y months
 > - that are pushing at least K MBit/s of traffic
 >
 > The "Big families" of Tor Relay are all run by "known" and "trustable"
 organizations (TorServers-alike).
 >
 > By using that approach the HSDir will be de-facto managed only by
 "Organizations that contribute to Tor network", that can be identified.

 You should realize at the phrase "the HSDir will be de-facto managed ...
 by organizations" that this is a bad idea. I would rather trust a large
 number of unknown people to be in sum honest and uncorrupted. These
 organizations would be able to, by consensus or legal action, censor or
 track hidden services.

 That is similar to the situation with version 1 of the hidden service
 spec, where authorities managed the HSDir.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8243#comment:9>
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