[tor-bugs] #10419 [Firefox Patch Issues]: Can requests to 127.0.0.1 be used to fingerprint the browser?
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Thu Jan 23 08:38:40 UTC 2014
#10419: Can requests to 127.0.0.1 be used to fingerprint the browser?
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
Reporter: mikeperry | Owner: mikeperry
Type: task | Status: needs_review
Priority: major | Milestone:
Component: Firefox Patch | Version:
Issues | Keywords: tbb-fingerprinting,
Resolution: | tbb-pref, MikePerry201401R
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
Changes (by mikeperry):
* keywords: tbb-fingerprinting => tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-pref,
MikePerry201401R
* status: new => needs_review
Comment:
I think that oc is right about not needing to browse localhost from TBB.
On top of that, I had assumed that the network.proxy.no_proxies_on setting
applied to *all* XUL JS too, so I never bothered trying to remove it,
thinking it was an obvious non-solution. In retrospect, it makes sense
that it does not harm New Identity or anything else in TBB, because we use
XPCOM socket interfaces for our extension-based localhost connections, and
not nsIChannel.
I'm going to try driving TBB on Mac and Linux around without it and see if
I notice anything. New Identity at least works fine on both here, too,
though. Which is a good sign.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10419#comment:13>
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