[tor-bugs] #10676 [Tor]: Verify urandom-style RNG is seeded before generating ID keys

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#10676: Verify urandom-style RNG is seeded before generating ID keys
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     Reporter:  nickm        |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  major        |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:  tor-server rng urandom startup
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
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Comment (by arma):

 Doing the blocking thing, with a log message beforehand, in the case where
 we're generating a long-term secret (relay identity key, hidden service
 identity key, especially anytime tor-gencert runs) sounds good to me.

 I would be a bit nervous doing it to clients, since I don't have a good
 handle on what weird edge cases would result in long waits. (I guess we
 could argue that long waits are better than silently bad entropy, but I'd
 hope there's a third even better option there.)

 Note that doing it on a fresh datadirectory will mean not doing it for any
 TBB users, since they come with a datadirectory already. Probably that's
 the case for many other package / bundle users too.

 Keeping a bit of randomness in the datadirectory is also fine with me if
 we actually think there are platforms out there with crummy entropy.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10676#comment:2>
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