[tor-bugs] #11396 [Tor]: Detect maximum memory at runtime to allow lower default than 8GB
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Fri Apr 4 04:55:08 UTC 2014
#11396: Detect maximum memory at runtime to allow lower default than 8GB
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Reporter: nickm | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_review
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-relay oom
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by arma):
Perhaps counterintuitively, so long as we get Linux sorted out, the others
don't matter as much. That's because the main anonymity attacks involve
knocking over many big relays, and if half the relays resist, your attack
doesn't get very far.
But that said, we shouldn't do this ticket simply because of a particular
anonymity attack that is made possible by this design flaw. We should do
the ticket so relays can't be knocked over (or worse, be used to knock
over other innocent processes if you run one).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11396#comment:2>
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