[tor-bugs] #2454 [Tor]: We should check our IP immediately when cbt notes the network is live again
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Tue Apr 1 22:22:36 UTC 2014
#2454: We should check our IP immediately when cbt notes the network is live again
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Reporter: Sebastian | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_revision
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-relay 025-triaged
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by andrea):
Replying to [comment:14 nickm]:
> The patch didn't apply to master, but it was pretty small, so I
recreated the changes by hand in branch "bug2454_025" in my public
repository. Note that master no longer has time_to_check_ipaddress.
>
> Changes/checks I'd suggest:
>
> 1) No global variables.
>
> 2) In fact, we don't need a new variable at all; as the code stands now,
we just need a function that resets time_to_check_descriptor() in main.c.
(But see 5 below.)
Yeah, that'd be cleaner.
> 3) I'd like to grep though all the calls to
circuit_build_times_network_is_live to make sure this really -should-
work.
Yeah.
> 4) Can this fire more than once every 3 minutes?
Do you mean you think three minutes is *too long* and we should recheck
sooner, or you're worried it might run too often and if it did something
it runs would either be too expensive or not idempotent?
> 5) Is there anything in that big block in main.c that we *don't* want to
do in this case?
It looks like most of that stuff has checks to stop it running too often,
but check_descriptor_ipaddress_changed() starts DNS queries in some cases
and routerlist_remove_old_routers() has a for loop over
routerlist->routers - might be worth limiting how often that runs.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2454#comment:15>
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