[tor-bugs] #9767 [Tor]: Implement proposal 222: Eliminate client timestamps in Tor

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#9767: Implement proposal 222: Eliminate client timestamps in Tor
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     Reporter:  nickm    |      Owner:
         Type:  defect   |     Status:  needs_review
     Priority:  major    |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
    Component:  Tor      |    Version:
   Resolution:           |   Keywords:  tor-client fingerprinting time
Actual Points:           |  prop222
       Points:           |  Parent ID:
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Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:6 andrea]:
 > > As for how to do this without an openssl patch, there's also the silly
 approach I described in
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7277#comment:8 .
 >
 > Yeah, that's possible too.  I'm not 100% sure off the top of my head ELF
 lets you get away with intercepting a call that doesn't cross library
 boundaries like that, but it's worth a shot.
 >
 > Hmm, actually, isn't RAND_* in libcrypto and the call we need to worry
 about in libssl?

 The thing here is that RAND_* indirects via the openssl engines mechanism,
 and RAND_set_rand_method() overrides it.

 That said, I am inclined to declare "remove timestamps from old openssl"
 orthogonal to "remove all Tor client timestamps" if we can merge this one.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9767#comment:8>
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